← SES-025 — Provider Capability and Fidelity Profiles · Standard Index · SES-100 — Forward Conformance Testing Specification →
Status: Draft 1.0 — Normative target.
Security claims become meaningful only when executable artifacts carry verifiable evidence connecting semantics, authority, planning, and provider guarantees.
A future proof object MUST be able to bind, at minimum:
Verification MUST occur before the execution boundary. Verification MUST fail closed on malformed, incomplete, stale, unverifiable, or incompatible proof material.
A security- or meaning-relevant optimizer rewrite MUST provide a certificate or independently checkable derivation showing why the transformed artifact remains within the authorized semantic envelope.
Where cryptographic integrity is required, implementations MUST define canonical input bytes, algorithm identifiers, key identifiers, trust anchors, rotation, revocation, and algorithm-agility rules. Cryptographic signing of an ambiguous serialization is non-conformant.
Define portable proof formats, proof composition, signature suites, key lifecycle, revocation, transparency/audit mechanisms, and lightweight proof verification suitable for constrained runtimes.
Mutating any meaning- or authority-relevant byte MUST invalidate verification. A stale policy, altered provider capability, altered IR, or altered contract MUST prevent execution.
← SES-025 — Provider Capability and Fidelity Profiles · Standard Index · SES-100 — Forward Conformance Testing Specification →